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By STEPHEN J. VASEK, JR.* AND C. CRAIG BRADLEY, JR.**
Certainly the most publicized developments in Kentucky
tax law during the current survey period were those legislative
reforms adopted by the special session of the Kentucky Gen-
eral Assembly in early 1979. Responding to demands for relief
from rising tax burdens, the legislature enacted H.B. 44 to
limit the impact of inflation on property taxes." These legisla-
tive changes were part of a nationwide wave of tax reform
proposals engendered by voter approval of California's Prop-
osition Thirteen in June, 1978. In addition to H.B. 44, this
article will examine selected judicial decisions involving the
taxation of intercorporate dividends, the sales and use tax, the
occupational license tax, and statutory provisions for alloca-
tion of corporate income.
I. LIMITATIONS ON PROPERTY TAXEs - H.B. 44
A. Limits on Property Taxes Levied by Bodies Other Than
the State
1. Real Property Taxes
The concept of a "compensating tax rate" was introduced
in 1965 to prevent enormous increases in real property taxes
resulting from the Kentucky Court of Appeals' decision in
Russman v. Luckett 2 which required all nonexempt property
to be valued for tax purposes at fair cash value. The compen-
sating tax rate which, when applied to the current year's as-
sessment of property subject to taxation in the prior year,
would produce revenue approximately equal to that produced
in the prior year.3 Between 1965 and 1971, growth in tax reve-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S., B.A. 1961, J.D. 1966,
Northwestern University; L.L.M. 1969, Harvard University.
** J.D. 1980, University of Kentucky.
1 1979 (Ex. Sess.) Ky. Acts ch. 25, preamble.
2 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965). See Note, Property Tax Revenue Assessment
Levels and Taxing Rates: The Kentucky Rollback Law, 60 Ky. L.J. 105 (1971).
3 1965 (1st Ex. Sess.) Ky. Acts ch. 2, § 11 (amending Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
132.010(6) (Baldwin 1955) [hereinafter cited as KRSA]. This act became known as
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nues could result only from improvements to existing prop-
erty or the addition of new properties to the tax rolls.4 These
new properties and improvements were taxed at the same rate
as other property. 5 The net effect of these provisions was to
freeze collection of property taxes at a maximum of the 1965
levels, plus amounts attributable to additions of new property
and improvements. 6
In 1972, Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section
132.010(6) was amended to define the compensating tax rate
as the rate which, when applied to the 1972 assessment exclu-
sive of net assessment growth as defined in KRS section
132.425, produced an amount of revenue approximately equal
to that produced in 1971.7 The year before, KRS section
132.425 was amended to provide that "net assessment
growth" includes the excess of the total current year's valua-
tion of property over the total prior year's valuation of prop-
erty." Thus the term "net assessment growth" included in-
creases in assessment due to valuation increases, as well as
increases due to the addition of new properties and improve-
ments to the tax rolls. The net effect of incorporating this new
definition of net assessment growth into the new definition of
the compensating tax rate was to freeze the effective tax rate
at the 1971 rate but to allow revenues to increase with prop-
erty valuation increases and additions of new property."
With H.B. 44,10 a new statutory scheme was enacted to
limit property tax revenues for 1979-80 and subsequent years.
First, counties, cities, urban-county governments, school dis-
tricts, and special taxing districts are prohibited from levying
the Rollback Law.
' For taxing limits of counties, see Ky. REv. STAT. § 68.245 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as KRS]; for taxing limits of school districts, see KRS § 160.470(3) (1971).
5 KRS §§ 68.245, 160.470(3) (1971). For a more detailed description of the appli-
cation of the Rollback Law to various taxing authorities, see 74 Op. Ky. Att'y Gen.
393 (1974).
6 See generally Note, supra note 2.
" 1972 Ky. Acts, ch. 285, § 1.
a 1970 Ky. Acts, ch. 260, § 1. Prior to this amendment, only improvements and
new properties added to the tax rolls constituted net assessment growth. 1965 (1st
Ex. Sess.) Ky. Acts., ch. 2, § 7.
See generally 74 Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. 455 (1971).
10 1979 (Ex. Sess.) Ky. Acts, ch. 25.
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a tax rate for 1979-80 which will produce more revenue, exclu-
sive of revenue from net assessment growth, than would be
produced by application of the maximum tax rate which could
have been levied in 1978-79 on the 1978-79 assessment (here-
inafter referred to as "maximum tax rate")., The maximum
tax rate limitation is like the 1972 compensating tax rate limi-
tation in that it restricts additional revenue to that produced
by application of a maximum tax rate to net assessment
growth, assuming the 1978-79 tax rate was set at its maximum
limit. In succeeding years the maximum tax rate is that rate
which will produce no more revenue, exclusive of revenue
from net assessment growth, than was produced in the pre-
12ceding year.
This limitation of the tax rate in the current year to a
rate which will produce current revenue, exclusive of revenue
produced by net assessment growth, equal to the amount of
revenue produced in the prior year does not, by itself, limit
increases in taxes and revenue resulting from higher property
valuations. That result was accomplished by a second limita-
tion which in general prohibits a county, city, urban-county
government, school district, or special taxing district from lev-
ying a tax rate which exceeds the compensating tax rate."
The definition of compensating tax rate was amended to mean
the rate applied to the current year's assessment of property
subject to taxation, excluding new property" and personal
property, which will produce revenue approximately equal to
that produced in the preceding year from real property.15 Like
the statutory taxing scheme enacted in 1965, H.B. 44 limits
the growth in revenue to that resulting from the addition of
11 KRSA § 68.245(1) (Baldwin 1979) (counties); KRSA § 132.023(1)(a) (Baldwin
1979) (special taxing districts); KRSA § 132.027(1)(a) (Baldwin 1979) (cities and ur-
ban-county governments); KRSA § 160.470(2) (Baldwin 1979) (school districts).
12 KRSA § 68.245(1) (Baldwin 1979) (counties); KRSA § 132.023(1)(b) (Baldwin
1979) (special taxing districts); KRSA § 132.027(1)(a) (Baldwin 1979) (cities and ur-
ban county governments); KRSA § 160.470(2) (Baldwin 1979) (school districts).
13 KRSA § 68.245(2) (Baldwin 1979) (counties); KRSA § 132.023(2) (Baldwin
1979) (special taxing districts); KRSA § 132.027(2) (Baldwin 1979) (cities and urban-
county governments); KRSA § 160.470(3) (Baldwin 1979) (school districts).
14 KRSA § 132.010(8) (Baldwin 1979) defines "new property" to include various
types of improvements to residential and non-residential real property.
15 KRSA § 132.010(6) (Baldwin 1979).
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new property and improvements to existing property. Under
this second limitation, an increase in property values in the
current year will require a reduction in the tax rate so that
the increase in property values other than that attributable to
new property and improvements to existing property will not
increase total current revenues to an amount greater than the
amount of revenue produced in the prior year. The purpose of
this limitation was to provide relief from rising tax burdens
attributable to inflated real property valuations.1"
As an exception to this limitation H.B. 44 permits a
county, city, urban-county government, school district, or spe-
cial taxing district to levy a tax at a rate higher than the com-
pensating tax rate (but not higher than the maximum tax rate
limitation) if the taxing body holds a public hearing before
levying the higher tax.17 Still, that portion of the tax rate lev-
ied which will produce revenue from real property, exclusive
of revenue from new property and improvements to existing
property, in excess of four percent over the amount of revenue
produced by the compensating tax rate from real property is
subject to recall vote or reconsideration by the taxing author-
ity.18 Thus, total real property tax revenues may be increased
following a public hearing by as much as four percent if sup-
ported by increased assessment values of like amount, or by
even greater amounts subject to recall vote and recon-
sideration.
2. Personal Property Taxes
Arguably a local taxing authority may not tax tangible
personal property at a rate different than that imposed on
real property.1 9 Thus, the limits on real property tax rates
mandated by H.B. 44 also appear to be applicable to the tax
16 1979 (Ex. Sess.) Ky. Acts, ch. 25, preamble.
17 KRSA § 68.245(5) (Baldwin 1979) (counties); KRSA § 132.023(3) (Baldwin
1979) (special taxing districts); KRSA § 132.027(3) (Baldwin 1979) (cities and urban-
county governments); KRSA § 160.470(10) (Baldwin 1979) (school districts).
Is KRSA § 68.245(6) (Baldwin 1979) (counties); KRSA § 132.023(4) (Baldwin
1979) (special taxing districts); KRSA § 132.027(4) (Baldwin 1979) (cities and urban-
county governments); KRSA § 160.470(11) (Baldwin 1979) (school districts).
' See Ky. CONST. §§ 171, 181; 60 Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. 807 (1960).
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rate imposed on personal property by counties, cities, urban-
county governments, school districts, and special taxing dis-
tricts. Thus, even though the compensating tax rate and pro-
visions for recall are based on real property tax rates, 0 those
tax rates finally determined applicable to real property also
should apply to personal property.
The combination of this required uniformity of tax rates
and the compensating rate limitation on real property tax lev-
ies could result in a reduction of the rates imposed on real
and personal property solely because of increases in the valua-
tion of real property. On the other hand, decreases in the
value of real property could result in increases in the tax rates
on both real and personal property. If fluctuations in the
value of real property are accompanied by comparable fluctu-
ations in the value of personal property, both in size and di-
rection, owners of personal property will get no special benefit
and suffer no special detriment by basing the personal prop-
erty tax rate on the rate of tax allowed for real property.
B. Limits on Property Taxes Levied by the State
The Kentucky state tax on real property is levied at a
rate of thirty-one and one-half cents per one hundred dollars
of value.21 H.B. 44 provides that this rate be reduced to com-
pensate for any increase in the aggregate assessed value of
real property to the extent that such increase exceeds the pre-
ceding year's assessment by more than four percent.22 If the
assessed value of all real property decreases from the preced-
ing year, the tax rate is to be increased to provide approxi-
mately the same amount of revenue as was derived in the pre-
ceding year.23
In periods of inflation, revenue from real property taxes
may be expected to increase automatically at a rate of four
percent per year. If assessed values increase by more than
that amount annually, the state tax rate on real property may
20 See KRSA § 132.010(6) (Baldwin 1979).
21 KRS § 132.020(1) (Supp. 1978).




decline somewhat, but total tax burdens will continue to rise
by four percent. The state tax rate of forty-five cents per one
hundred dollars of value of tangible personal property24 is not
subject to reduction because of any valuation increases.
II. JumciAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. Intercorporate Dividends
KRS section 141.010(12)(b) excludes from gross income div-
idends received by a corporation after December 31, 1969. In
Refiners Oil Corporation v. Department of Revenue2 5 the
Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the exclusion for inter-
corporate dividends exempts dividends as defined by Ken-
tucky law rather than by the Internal Revenue Code.26 There
is no definition of dividend income in the Kentucky tax stat-
utes. KRS section 271A.225, which restricts a board of direc-
tors to declaring and paying dividends in cash or property
only out "of unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus, or
out of the unreserved and unrestricted net earnings of the
current fiscal year and the next preceding fiscal year taken as
a single period, ' 27 however, arguably provides a definition.
The Internal Revenue Code utilizes a broader definition, de-
fining dividends as "any distribution of property by a corpora-
tion to its shareholders (1) out of its earnings and profits ac-
cumulated after February 28, 1913, or (2) out of its earnings
and profits of the taxable year . . .,,8
Refiners received substantial distributions on stock it
owned in Plantation Pipeline Company (Plantation). The
amount of the distribution exceeded Plantation's current and
accumulated earnings and profits for federal tax purposes,
such earnings and profits reflecting the use of accelerated de-
24 KRSA § 132.020(1) (Baldwin 1979).
25 No. 78-CA-846-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 1979), discretionary review granted
sub nom. Department of Revenue v. Refiners Oil Corp., 589 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1979).
28 No. 78-CA-846-MR, slip op. at 4 (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 1979).
27 KRS § 271A.225(1)(a) (Supp. 1978). Prior to adoption of the new Kentucky
Business Corporation Act, 1972 Ky. Acts ch. 274, the comparable statutory provision
was codified at KRS § 271.265 (1971).
28 I.R.C. § 316(a).
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preciation.29 The amount distributed in excess of Plantation's
earnings and profits was reported by Refiners in 1970 for fed-
eral tax purposes as return of capital and capital gain.30 In
subsequent years such excess was treated for federal tax pur-
poses as capital gain because Refiners had recovered its entire
basis in its stock in Plantation. Although these distributions
exceeded Plantation's earnings and profits as defined for fed-
eral income tax purposes,31 the distributions did not exceed
Plantation's unreserved and unrestricted earnings of the then
current fiscal year and the preceding fiscal year taken as a sin-
gle period.32 The retained earnings for the current and preced-
ing year were higher than earnings and profits because Refin-
ers used straight line depreciation in computing its retained
earnings but utilized accelerated depreciation to compute its
earnings and profits.33
The Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals held that the De-
partment of Revenue correctly adopted the federal tax law
definition of dividends and, therefore, disallowed exclusion of
those portions of the distributions reported by Refiners for
federal tax purposes as return of capital and capital gain -
that is, in excess of Plantation's earnings and profits.34 The
Board of Tax Appeals concluded that since there was no defi-
nition of dividends for Kentucky tax law purposes, KRS sec-
tion 141.050(1), 35 which previously had been interpreted as re-
20 Refiners Oil Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 2 Ky. TAx REP. (CCH) 201-386
at 10,853-54 (Ky. B.T.A. 1976).
30 Id. at 10,853. Distributions to shareholders are treated for federal tax purposes
as dividends to the extent of current and accumulated earnings and profits, any ex-
cess being treated either as a return of capital which reduces the shareholder's basis
in his shares, or as gain on the sale or exchange of such shares to the extent of
amounts in excess of the shareholder's basis. I.R.C. § 301(c).
32 2 Ky. TAX REP. (CCH) 201-386 at 10,853. There is no comprehensive defini-
tion of "earnings and profits" in the Internal Revenue Code, but I.R.C. § 312 does
state the effects of certain transactions on earnings and profits, and the regulations go
further in defining that term. See generally B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL IN-
COME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS % 7.03 (3rd ed. 1971).
22 Refiners Oil Corp. v. Department of Revenue, No. 78-CA-846-MR, slip op. at
3.
33 2 Ky. TAX REP. (CCH) % 201-386 at 10,854 (Ky. B.T.A. 1976).
34 Id.
35 This statute provides:
Except to the extent required by differences between this chapter and
1979-19801
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quiring the application of federal laws and rules not
inconsistent with Kentucky laws,3 6 mandated the use of the
federal tax law definition. On appeal from a circuit court judg-
ment upholding the Board of Tax Appeals' decision, the court
of appeals disagreed and held that the definition of dividends
contained in KRS section 271A.225, the section detailing the
funds out of which a board of directors may declare and pay
dividends, must be used since Kentucky's method of taxation
of intercorporate dividends is inconsistent with their treat-
ment under federal tax law.S7 The entire distribution, there-
fore, including those portions treated as a return of capital
and a capital gain for federal tax purposes, was excludable
under KRS section 141.010(12)(b) as an intercorporate
dividend.3 8
The court of appeals' decision presents several problems,
one of which is its conclusion that the entire distribution
should be treated as a dividend, including the portion repre-
senting a return of capital.39 KRS section 141.010(12) excludes
intercorporate dividends from "gross income." 40 A portion of
the Federal income tax law and it[s] application, the administrative and
judicial interpretations of the Federal income tax law, computations of
gross income and deductions therefrom, accounting methods, and account-
ing procedures, for purposes of this chapter shall be as nearly as practicable
identical with those required for Federal income tax purposes.
KRS § 141.050(1) (Supp. 1978).
36 Koehler v. Commonwealth, 432 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Ky. 1968). On appeal to the
court of appeals from a circuit court judgment affirming the Board of Tax Appeals'
decision, both Refiners Oil and the Department of Revenue relied on Brown v. De-
partment of Revenue, 558 S.W.2d 635 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). The court in Brown re-
fused to allow the taxpayer to deduct losses incurred by the Subchapter S corporation
in which he was a shareholder. In light of the overall scheme and purposes of the
Kentucky income tax law, which is to disallow Subchapter S treatment, the court
refused to interpret Kentucky law as including any of the federal Subchapter S provi-
sions, notwithstanding that the federal provisions permitting flow-through of Sub-
chapter S losses to shareholders were not negated specifically by the Kentucky in-
come tax statutes for the years in question. 558 S.W.2d at 637-39.
11 No. 78-CA-846-MR, slip op. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
While the court does not explicitly state that Refiners should be allowed to
reduce its gross income by the full amount of the distribution, including that portion
which was not includible in its gross income because it constituted a return of capital,
such a conclusion seems required by the court's reversal of the circuit court judgment
upholding the decision by the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals. See id. at 2, 4.
40 KRS § 141.010(12) (Supp. 1978).
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the distribution received by Refiners represented a return of
capital,41 however, and therefore was not includible in its
gross income. Since this portion of the distribution was not
includible in Refiners' gross income it could not be excluded
without turning the exclusion into a deduction. Clearly KRS
section 141.010(12)(b) was not intended to allow deduction of
amounts in excess of those included in gross income by reason
of intercorporate distribution. Hence, only that portion of the
distribution not representing a return of capital should be ex-
cludible regardless of the definition applied. 2
A more difficult problem is the court's conclusion that the
Kentucky and federal statutory schemes are inconsistent,
thereby requiring the use of a state law definition.43 Although
the court did not recount the discrepancies, one difference be-
tween the two statutory schemes is that under Kentucky in-
come tax law, intercorporate dividends are excluded entirely
from the recipient's gross income,44 but under federal law the
recipient of intercorporate dividends is allowed, in general, a
deduction equal to eighty-five percent of the dividends re-
ceived.45 That Kentucky law treats dividends differently than
does federal tax law, however, does not preclude resort to the
federal tax law definition of a dividend. The difference in tax
treatment of dividends under Kentucky and federal income
tax laws does not necessarily render the two statutory
schemes inconsistent, thus requiring the use of different defi-
nitions. Moreover, use of the federal tax law definition of divi-
dends arguably is consistent with the purpose of Kentucky tax
law.
If the purpose of Kentucky tax law is to exclude from in-
come only that portion of intercorporate distributions which
are includible in the corporate distributee's gross income as
"dividend income," use of the federal tax law definition of
dividend income is consistent with Kentucky tax law pur-
poses. On the other hand, if the purpose of the Kentucky ex-
" 2 Ky. TAX. REP. (CCH) % 201-386 at 10,853.
42 See also id. at 10,855.
4 No. 78-CA-846-MR, slip op. at 3-4.
4 KRS § 141.010(12)(b) (Supp. 1978).
45 I.R.C. § 243.
1979-1980]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
clusion for intercorporate dividends is to make non-taxable
under Kentucky income tax law all intercorporate distribu-
tions out of earned surplus, including distributions treated as
capital gain under federal income tax law, then use of the fed-
eral tax law definition for Kentucky income tax purposes is
inappropriate.
For example, assume Plantation distributed $100 to Re-
finers on shares owned by Refiners in Plantation. Further, as-
sume that Plantation had earnings and profits of $30 and an
earned surplus of $100, and that Refiners' basis in the Planta-
tion shares is $60. Under federal income tax law and the posi-
tion advanced by the Department of Revenue, Refiners has
received $30 of dividend income, $60 return of capital and $10
of capital gain.46 Refiners' gross income from this transaction
is $40. Under the court of appeals decision the entire $100 is
dividend income since there was sufficient earned surplus
from which the dividend could have been paid under KRS
section 271A.225. Although for federal tax law purposes $10 of
the distribution is treated not as dividend income but instead
as income from the sale or exchange of property and taxed at
favorable long term capital gains rates,4 7 Kentucky income tax
law does not provide favorable treatment for long term capital
gains received by a corporation.48 Thus, if the federal tax law
definition of dividend is incorporated into Kentucky law that
portion of intercorporate distributions representing capital
gains will receive less favorable treatment under Kentucky
40 I.R.C. § 301(c).
47 Long term capital gains are taxable to corporations in the same manner as
ordinary income or at a rate of 28%, whichever is more favorable to the taxpayer.
I.R.C. § 1201(a). The 28% alternative corporate tax on long-term capital gains may
be more favorable than taxation as ordinary income if the effective tax rate on corpo-
rate income exceeds 28%. See generally [1979] 6 FED. TAXEs (P-H) I 32,011(b). For
taxable years beginning in 1971 or later and ending before January 1, 1979, the alter-
native rate was 30%.
Because of the 85% dividends received deduction, however, characterization of
income as capital gains is generally less favorable under federal income tax law than
if it is characterized as dividend income. For example, if a corporation in the 46% tax
bracket had $100 of dividend income it would pay $6.90 tax on such dividend income.
If that same corporation received $100 of long-term capital gains income its tax would
be $28. I.R.C. § 1201 (alternative tax).
48 But see KRS § 141.010(12)(d) (Supp. 1978) (gains on disposal of coal).
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law than under federal law. Arguably, the exclusion for inter-
corporate dividend income was not intended to create more
onerous Kentucky income tax burdens on intercorporate dis-
tributions than are imposed by the federal income tax law.
The unfavorable Kentucky income tax treatment of the $10
gain, however, is not caused by the Kentucky exclusion for
intercorporate dividend income, but rather results from the
failure of Kentucky income tax laws to give special treatment
to long-term capital gains realized by corporations.
This inconsistency of treatment of intercorporate distri-
butions-i.e., capital gains under federal tax law as opposed
to ordinary income under Kentucky tax law, an 85% divi-
dends received deduction under federal law as opposed to
100% exclusion under Kentucky law-should not require the
use of a state law definition for dividend income different
than the federal law definition. If, however, rules of statutory
construction were violated or the legislative intent would be
thwarted by the use of the federal law definition then the
state definition should apply.
The rule of statutory construction that tax statutes are to
be interpreted most favorably to the taxpayer49 provides little
assistance, as adoption of a local law definition of dividend
income different from that in the federal tax law would bene-
fit some taxpayers and burden others. For example, an inter-
corporate distribution might be declared and paid out of earn-
ings and profits and thus be includible in gross income, but
not be a dividend under Kentucky or applicable local law and
therefore not excludible.60 While adoption of the Kentucky
law definition in Refiners Oil benefited the taxpayer, if the
distribution was unlawful under applicable local law,51 or was
declared by the board of directors out of capital surplus, 2 or
was a stock redemption or liquidation distribution treated as
a dividend for federal tax law purposes, 53 it would not be ex-
19 3 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 66.01 (4th ed.
1974).
50 See B. BiTTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 31, at 7.02.
"I See B. BrrITKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 31, at 7.02.
52 See, e.g., KRS § 271A.230 (Supp. 1978).
13 See I.R.C. §§ 302(d), 316(a)(2), 346.
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cludible under Kentucky law, yet it might be excludible if the
federal definition were adopted. Even if adoption of the local
law definition of dividends were favorable to all taxpayers it is
arguable that since KRS section 141.010(12)(b) provides an
exemption from taxation it should be strictly construed in
favor of the taxing authority.
54
Legislative intent also is useful in determining the scope
of the intercorporate dividend income exclusion. The court of
appeals in Refiners Oil without hesitation noted that "[tihere
is no reason to doubt that in enacting the post-December 31,
1969 dividend exclusion the General Assembly intended to ex-
clude all true dividends as defined under Kentucky law."'
Presumably the court meant dividends as defined under KRS
section 271A.225. 6 There are, however, a number of reasons
for questioning the correctness of this conclusion.
KRS section 271A.225 arguably does not provide a defini-
tion of "dividend" but merely describes dividends which the
board of directors legally may declare. Even if KRS section
271A.225 can be construed as defining "dividend," the exclu-
sion under KRS section 141.010(12)(b) is for "dividend in-
come" and not for "dividends." It seems reasonable to con-
clude that the General Assembly intended for different
definitions to govern a board of directors' power to declare
and pay dividends and a corporation's ability to exclude cer-
tain intercorporate distributions as dividend income. For ex-
ample, it seems questionable that in enacting an exclusion for
dividend income that the General Assembly solely was con-
templating dividends which a board of directors legally might
declare under Kentucky law. If, for example, a corporation in-
3 J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 49, at § 66.09.
No. 78-CA-846-MR, slip op. at 4.
" The court of appeals found that the distributions were out of unreserved and
unrestricted earnings of the current and next preceding fiscal year and did not render
Plantation insolvent or diminish its capital. This is the test determining the authority
of the board of directors to declare a dividend under KRS § 271A.225. The court of
appeals also stated that "[t]he distributions were clearly dividends as defined under
the only Kentucky statute defining dividends." Id. at 3.
Prior to the adoption of the new Kentucky Business Corporation Act, 1972 Ky.




corporated in Illinois makes a cash distribution to a Kentucky
corporation, did the legislature intend to allow the Kentucky
corporation to exclude the distribution from its income only if
the distribution could qualify as a legal dividend under KRS
section 271A.225? One problem with the court of appeals'
conclusion that the General Assembly intended to adopt the
definition contained in KRS section 271A.225 is that Ken-
tucky corporations now are forced to analyze corporations'
financial statements to determine whether distributions made
by the foreign corporations meet the definition contained in
KRS section 271A.225.
The legislative history, although sparse, supports the
choice of federal law rather than the KRS section 271A.225
definition of dividend income. Prior to 1954 the Kentucky in-
come tax statutes defined a "dividend" as any distribution
made by a corporation out of current or accumulated earnings
and profits.57 In 1954 this definition was deleted from the
Kentucky statute along with other provisions giving special
treatment to corporate distributions under Kentucky income
tax law"8 in order to achieve greater uniformity between Ken-
tucky and federal income tax laws.59 Since the bill establish-
ing the intercorporate dividend exclusion was an income tax
law, 0 it is arguable that the legislature was considering divi-
dends as defined for income tax purposes. The only relevant
definition of dividend income at that time was contained in
the federal income tax law.
Other considerations mandate adoption of the federal
definition. The federal tax law treatment of dividend income
is sufficiently complex without the additional complexity en-
5 1936 (3d Ex. Sess.) Ky. Acts ch. 7, § 1.
18 1954 Ky. Acts, ch. 79, § 1. See Allphin, 1954 Kentucky Tax Legislation, 43 Ky.
L.J. 76, 80 (1955).
9 In 1954, Kentucky adopted whole-heartedly the theory that the state in-
come tax ought to conform as nearly as possible to the federal income tax.
Since then the law has been amended frequently to keep it tied explicitly to
the changing federal income tax. Definitions have been revised frequently
by adopting those in the Internal Revenue Code.
Ky. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH CoMM'N, STATE-FEDERAL INcoME TAX CONFORMITy IN KEN-
TUCKY, RESEARCH REP. No. 8, at 2 (1961).
60 1970 Ky. Acts, ch. 216.
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gendered by adoption of a state law definition of dividend in-
come. Adoption of a state law definition would raise many is-
sues involving the scope of that definition and its interaction
with the federal tax law treatment of dividend income. Since
use of the federal tax law definition is consistent with the leg-
islative intent and purpose of KRS section 141.050(1), Ken-
tucky should not use a local law definition of dividend income
different from the federal definition.
B. Sales and Use Tax
Purchases of machinery for new and expanded industry
are exempted from the sales and use tax under KRS section
139.480(8).61 To qualify for the new and expanded industry
exclusion, the machinery or equipment must be used directly
in the manufacturing or production process, be incorporated
into plant facilities for the first time, and not be used to re-
place existing machinery.6 2 Recent cases considering this ex-
emption have focused on the requirement that qualifying ma-
chinery be used directly in the manufacturing process."3 In the
most recent of these decisions, Department of Revenue v.
State Contracting and Stone Co., 6 4 the Kentucky Supreme
61 KRS § 139.480(8) (Supp. 1978).
62 KRS § 139.170 (Supp. 1978). Regulations issued by the Department of Reve-
nue defining the new and expanded industry exemption provide:
The machinery and the appurtenant equipment necessary to the completed
installation of such machinery, together with the materials used directly in
the installation of such machinery and appurtenant equipment, which are
incorporated for the first time into new or existing plant facilities, or which
are installed in the place of existing plant machinery having a lesser pro-
ductive capacity, and which are directly used in a manufacturing or
processing production operation shall be exempt from the sales and use tax.
103 KAR 30:120(1) (1979).
63 Ross v. Greene & Webb Lumber Co., 567 S.W.2d 302 (Ky. 1978); Department
of Revenue v. Kuhlman Corp., 564 S.W.2d 14 (Ky. 1978) (per curiam). For a discus-
sion of these cases see Whiteside & Harman, Kentucky Law Survey- Kentucky Taxa-
tion, 67 Ky. L.J. 739, 748-51 (1978-79).
572 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Ky. 1978). In 1974 the General Assembly amended KRS
§ 139.480 to exclude purchases of pollution control equipment from the sales and use
tax. 1974 Ky. Acts, ch. 137, § 2. In order to qualify for the exemption, the taxpayer
must obtain a pollution control tax exemption certificate from the Kentucky Depart-
ment for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection. KRS §§ 224.850-.852
(Supp. 1978). Equipment eligible for the exclusion includes any device or system in-
stalled for the primary purpose of reducing or eliminating the emission of air, water,
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Court held that pollution control equipment and hot-mix stor-
age bins purchased by the taxpayer for use in an asphalt man-
ufacturing and limestone quarrying business were directly in-
volved in the production process and therefore exempt from
sales and use tax under KRS section 139.480(8).
The pollution control equipment was installed in State
Contracting and Stone Co.'s Hartford, Kentucky plant to reg-
ulate dust emissions from a limestone crusher and to bring
the crusher into conformity with federal standards. The addi-
tion of the pollution control devices was mandated by federal
law, and without such equipment the crusher would not have
continued to operate, forcing the taxpayer to suspend plant
operations. 65 Although the crusher itself was conceded to be
involved directly in the production process, the availability of
the exemption for the pollution control equipment was chal-
lenged by the Department of Revenue on the grounds that the
latter was not immediately engaged in the physical manufac-
ture of asphalt. The Court rejected such a literal application
of "used directly in the manufacturing process" requirement,
holding that the pollution control equipment was a functional
prerequisite to the continued operation of the taxpayer's busi-
ness and therefore qualified for the exclusion.66
Of particular significance is the Court's conclusion that
the pollution control devices were tax-exempt under KRS sec-
tion 139.480(8) since they constituted "an essential part of
the manufacturing process" and were functionally "indispen-
sable" to the continued operation of the crusher.6 7 Previously,
no objective meaning had been given to the requirement that
purchases qualifying under KRS section 139.480(8) be used
or noise pollutants, or the disposal or conversion of solid waste materials. Id. In a
recent decision by the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals, the exemption was denied on
the grounds that the equipment in question was not purchased primarily for the pur-
pose of controlling air pollution, but rather as an efficiency measure to increase busi-
ness income. The applicable test articulated by the Board was not whether the equip-
ment in fact reduced emissions, but whether the items constituted pollution control
equipment as defined in KRS § 224.850. Murphy-Miller Co. v. Department for Natu-
ral Resources and Environmental Protection, 2 Ky. TAX REP. (CCH) 201-532 (Ky.
B.T.A. 1979).
61 572 S.W.2d at 422.
e6 Id.
11 Id. (emphasis added).
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"directly" in the manufacturing process. 8 If applied in all
cases in which taxpayers sought to qualify purchases under
the new and expanded industry exemption, a strict standard
of necessity or indispensability would ostensibly serve to deny
the exclusion to machinery or equipment which, although im-
mediately engaged in the actual production process, was not
indispensable to the manufacture of a finished product.
Therefore, equipment purchased to increase productivity or
improve quality control would arguably be denied tax-exempt
status on the grounds that such devices were not essential to
the manufacture of a marketable or salable product. Such a
result would significantly restrict the economic impact of the
new and expanded industry exemption, and would be incon-
sistent with the legislative intent to promote industrial effi-
ciency and "enhance Kentucky's competitive position in man-
ufacturing. '" 9 A more reasonable interpretation of the Court's
opinion would apply this restrictive construction of "used di-
rectly in the manufacturing process" only where equipment or
machinery itself serves no manufacturing function, but is only
peripherally related to the principle production process.7'
The Court next considered the question of the hot-mix
storage bins which were installed to stabilize the temperature
of the asphalt product and to cross-blend the various compo-
nent parts of the mixture into a homogeneous finished prod-
uct.7 1 In order to determine whether this equipment was used
directly in production the Court attempted to define the
boundaries of the asphalt manufacturing process. The major-
38 Dictum in an earlier case, Ross v. Greene & Webb Lumber Co., 567 S.W.2d
302, 304 (Ky. 1978), is strongly suggestive of a necessity standard. See Whiteside &
Harman, supra note 63, at 750. The sales and use tax regulations state that qualifying
machinery must be "intimately involved in production" and "[tihe fact that machin-
ery is necessary for a manufacturing process does not automatically qualify it for
exemption." 103 KAR 30:120(2) (1979).
69 Department of Revenue v. State Contracting and Stone Co., 572 S.W.2d 421,
422 (Ky. 1978); accord, Ross v. Greene & Webb Lumber Co., 567 S.W.2d 302, 304
(Ky. 1978); Commonwealth v. WLEX-TV, Inc., 438 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Ky. 1969).
70 See Department of Revenue v. Kuhlman Corp., 564 S.W.2d 14 (Ky. 1978) (per
curiam) (exemption denied for the purchase of a computer on the grounds that the
equipment was not attached to production machinery and did not participate in
physical production).
71 572 S.W.2d at 423.
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ity concluded that the asphalt mix was not a finished, market-
able product until it had passed through the hot-mix storage
bins, and the manufacturing process was incomplete until the
mixture had been blended and homogenized.72 Accordingly,
on the basis of the integrated plant concept adopted in prior
cases,73 the majority found the devices to be an integral part
of the asphalt manufacturing process and held them exempt
from sales and use tax as machinery for new and expanded
industry.7
4
In his dissent, Justice Stephenson challenged the exempt
status of the hot-mix storage bins, characterizing the equip-
ment as a mere "convenience" added to improve the quality
of an "already saleable product" and to enhance profit poten-
tial.& In support of his conclusion that the devices were not
"directly" involved in the asphalt manufacturing process, Jus-
tice Stephenson noted that the taxpayer was able to actively
and profitably market an asphalt product prior to installation
of the storage bins.76 Upholding the exemption in this in-
stance, he concluded, would "effectively abolish the limiting
effect of 'used directly in the manufacturing process'" and
render tax-exempt "the installation of any equipment or ma-
chinery however casually related to the manufacturing
process.
'77
72 Id. at 422-23.
7. While the Court did not explicitly rely on the integrated plant concept, it in
fact applied it. The focus of the integrated plant concept is on defining the beginning
and the end of the manufacturing process. Once these boundaries have been estab-
lished, all production processes in between are considered to be "integrated" into the
manufacturing scheme, and the requirement that equipment be used directly in pro-
duction "should not be construed to require the breakdown of the manufacturing
process into distinct stages." Schenley Distillers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.2d
598, 599 (Ky. 1971). The manufacturing process has been said to begin when "raw
material.., starts moving in a chain of unbroken, integrated sequence into the plant
or mill" and ends with the manufacture of a "generally accepted saleable product."
Ross v. Greene & Webb Lumber Co., 567 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Ky. 1978). Thus, machin-
ery employed within this progression constitutes an integral part of the production
process and is "'directly used in the manufacturing process.'" Id.
7' 572 S.W.2d at 422-23.






The dissent's approach as to whether the taxpayer was
able to produce a salable product is similar to the majority
opinion concerning the pollution control device.7 8 That is, if
only equipment or machinery shown to be indispensable to
the manufacture of a finished product qualifies for the exemp-
tion, then under the approach adopted by the dissent, taxpay-
ers producing a salable product presumably would be forever
precluded from qualifying purchases under KRS section
139.480(8). If the new and expanded industry exemption is to
continue to function as a means of enlarging productive ca-
pacity, however, equipment or machinery engaged in physical
production should qualify for the exclusion without regard to
its relative importance in the overall manufacturing scheme.
Only those devices discharging functions ancillary to the pri-
mary production process should be subjected to the limiting
consequences of a standard based upon necessity or
indispensability.
C. Occupational License Tax
Pursuant to authority conferred upon first-class cities by
KRS section 91.200(1), 7 the City of Louisville imposes an oc-
cupational license tax on local businesses, trades, and occupa-
tions for the privilege of conducting business in the city °0
Revenue is derived in part through the imposition of a tax on
net profits generated by business activities conducted in the
78 See text accompanying notes 67-70 supra for discussion of the Court's opinion
concerning the pollution control equipment.
79 KRS § 91.200(1) (Supp. 1978) provides in part:
[T]he board of aldermen of every city of the first class ... may by ordi-
nance impose license fees on franchises .... License fees on a business,
trade, occupation or profession for revenue purposes may be imposed...
on . . . the net profits of all businesses, professions, or occupations from
activities conducted in the city ....
'* LOUISVILLE, Ky., GEN. ORDINANCES ch. 727 (1978). The constitutionality of the
occupational license tax ordinance was upheld in City of Louisville v. Sebree, 214
S.W.2d 248 (Ky. 1948), and recent cases have reaffirmed the validity of this holding.
Commissioners of the Sinking Fund v. Estate of Doyle, 573 S.W.2d 932, 934-35 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1978); Avery Fed. Sav. and Loan Assoc. v. Meyers, No. CA-219-MR, slip op.
at 4 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1977), appeal dismissed for want of final judgment, 47
U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. Sept. 31, 1978) (No. 78-293).
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city."' In the most recent challenge to the application of Lou-
isville's occupational license tax ordinance, Commissioners of
the Sinking Fund v. Estate of Doyle,82 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals upheld the authority of the Commissioners of the
Sinking Fund (Sinking Fund) to tax rental income and gains
from the sale of real property held for rental purposes. The
principal question addressed by the court was whether the
holding of real property for investment purposes constitutes a
taxable trade or business within the meaning of the local oc-
cupational license tax ordinance and KRS section 91.200.8
The Sinking Fund appealed from a decision by the Jeffer-
son Circuit Court that any enforcement of the occupational
license tax against individuals holding rental property would
be unconstitutional.84 In so holding, the trial court invalidated
an administrative regulation issued by the Sinking Fund es-
tablishing an exemption for individuals devoting less than
thirty percent of their time to the operation and management
8, LOUISVILLE, Ky., GEN. ORDINANCES § 727.02(a), (b) (1978).
82 573 S.W.2d 932, 937 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). In a related development, the United
States Supreme Court dismissed for lack of final judgment an appeal taken from a
ruling by the Kentucky Court of Appeals that savings and loan associations are sub-
ject to the occupational license taxes levied by Louisville and Jefferson County, and
that interest income earned by such institutions on federal securities is not exempt
from the tax under 31 U.S.C. § 742. Avery Fed. Sav. and Loan Assoc. v. Meyers, No.
CA-219-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1977), appeal dismissed for want of final judg-
ment, 47 U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. Sept. 31, 1978) (No. 78-293). The court of appeals ex-
pressed agreement with a 1971 opinion by the Kentucky Attorney General concluding
that savings and loan associations are subject to local license taxes, and that such a
tax does not violate the restrictions on taxation of savings and loan associations con-
tained in KRS § 136.300. 71 Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. 288 (1971). See also 71 Op. Ky. Att'y
Gen. 518 (1971). The court of appeals further found that the local license tax quali-
fied as a "nondiscriniinatory franchise tax" permissible under 31 U.S.C. § 742 (1976).
No. CA-219-MR, slip op. at 5. While agreeing that as a matter of law savings and loan
associations are subject to the tax and that interest income on federal securities could
be taxed without violating federal law, the court of appeals reversed that portion of
the trial court's order granting summary judgment on the issue of liability for pay-
ment of the tax, holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
the Sinking Fund was seeking to enforce the tax in a discriminatory manner. Id. at 6-
7.
'3 The occupational license tax ordinance defines "business" as "an enterprise,
activity, profession, or undertaking of any nature conducted for gain or profit,
whether conducted by an individual, co-partnership, association, or any other en-
tity ... " LOUISVILLE, Ky., GEN. ORDINANCES § 727.01(c) (1978).
" No. CA-219-MR, slip op. at 2.
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of income-producing property.15 Various parties cross-ap-
pealed from that portion of the trial court's opinion sustaining
the authority of the Sinking Fund to tax rental income and
gains from the sale of rental property held by any partnership
or corporation, whether for business or investment purposes.
While apparently rejecting the trial court's decision that
enforcement of the tax against individuals holding rental
property would be unconstitutional, the court of appeals
agreed that certain forms of individual involvement in rental
activity may be sufficiently limited to justify a finding that
such individuals are not engaged in a true business venture,
and that "it would be neither proper nor administratively fea-
sible to subject such an individual to an occupational tax."1
The court concluded that "[s]ome rule is necessary to exclude
those individuals who truly are not in 'business' but who have
merely invested some savings in rental property and who




and sustained the thirty percent rule adopted by the Sinking
Fund as a reasonable method of distinguishing an exempt in-
vestment venture from activity constituting a taxable rental
business.88 The court emphasized, however, that this rule
merely establishes a presumption of taxable business activity,
subject to rebuttal.89
Stating that by their nature partnerships and corpora-
tions are "uniquely 'business' organizations," the court of ap-
peals held that such entities may be presumed to be engaged
in some form of taxable business endeavor.90 As a result, in-
come generated by real property held by partnerships and
corporations will be subject to the occupational tax on busi-
85 Commisssoners of the Sinking Fund v. Estate of Doyle, 573 S.W.2d 932, 934
(Ky. Ct. App. 1978). See LOUISVILLE, Ky., LICENSE TAx REG. § 3.4(b)(2) (1979).
11 573 S.W.2d at 935.
87 Id.
88 Id.
'1 Id. See LOUISVILLE, Ky., LICENSE TAx REG. § 3.4(b)(2) (1979).
go 573 S.W.2d at 935. See 4A J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INco E TAXATION §
25.08, at 32 (rev. ed. 1979). The court's characterization of partnerships and corpora-
tions holding rental property is in accord with the license tax regulations issued by
the Sinking Fund, which provide that "[all corporations engaged in the rental of real
estate or partnerships organized for that purpose shall be considered to be engaged in
[taxable] activity." LOUISVILLE, Ky., LICENSE TAx REG. § 3.4(b)(3) (1979).
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ness profits without regard to the extent or nature of the tax-
payers' involvement in the management or operation of the
enterprise. In response to arguments that this disparate treat-
ment of partnerships and corporations is unconstitutionally
discriminatory,91 the court noted that Kentucky courts have
consistently held that individuals and corporations may be
placed in different categories for tax purposes without violat-
ing constitutional restrictions. 2 The court had little difficulty
extending this distinction to partnerships as well.93
Discussing the taxation of gains realized on the sale of as-
sets, the court of appeals stated that, inasmuch as "gain on
the sale of assets is a natural part of the earnings an individ-
ual, a partnership, or a corporation derives from a business,"
gains realized on the sale of rental property "should be sub-
ject to the license tax in the same manner and to the same
extent as capital gains are considered to be taxable income for
federal taxes."'' 4 Consistent with the court's treatment of
rental income, the tax presumably would apply to all sales of
rental property held by partnerships and corporations, and to
those sales of property held by individuals deemed to be en-
gaged in "business" conduct, that is, those who meet the
thirty percent rule." If gains realized on the sale of rental
property are to be subject to the occupational tax "in the
same manner and to the same extent" as capital gains are
taxed for federal income tax purposes, however, the question
remains whether the favorable tax treatment given a sale or
exchange of capital or quasi-capital assets under federal in-
come tax law should likewise be incorporated into the local
taxing scheme.96
91 The cross-appellants argued that the disparate treatment violated Ky. CONST.
§ 171 which requires taxes to be uniform within classes and Ky. CONST. § 174 which
mandates that corporate and individual property be taxed at the same rate.
92 573 S.W.2d at 935-36. See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 158-62
(1910); Square D Co. v. Kentucky Bd. of Tax Appeals, 415 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Ky.
1967).
11 573 S.W.2d at 936.
94 Id.
95 See LOUISVILLE, Ky., LICENSE TAx REG. § 3.4(b)(2) (1979).
96 "Net profit" is defined by the occupational license tax ordinance to include
"the net income from the operation of a business, or enterprise,. . . and shall specifi-
cally be equal to and the same as a person's net income for Federal income tax pur-
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The court's approach to the issue of taxation of rental in-
come in the hands of non-individuals seems overly simplistic
and imposes an undue tax burden on non-individual owners of
income-producing real property who often hold such property
for the same basic investment purposes as individuals. While
the court's treatment of corporations as presumptively busi-
ness entities probably is correct, this nominal characterization
fails to recognize, particularly with respect to partnerships,
the legitimate non-business opportunities and purposes un-
derlying many modern forms of non-individual ownership of
income-producing real estate. If rental income earned by indi-
viduals is to be exempted from occupational tax as investment
income on the grounds of limited managerial or supervisory
involvement, then non-individuals should be afforded an
equal opportunity to demonstrate the investment nature of
their ownership in a manner consistent with this standard.9
That is, income earned by non-individual owners of rental
property devoting less than the minimum amount of time
sanctioned by the court in Estate of Doyle to the operation
poses.. . ." LOUISVILLE, Ky., GEN. ORDINANCES § 727.01(j) (1978). Thus, in accord
with this definition, individual and non-corporate taxpayers found to be engaged in a
taxable rental busines within the meaning of the ordinance would arguably be enti-
tled to a deduction from gross income in the amount of 60% of the excess of gain
over loss realized upon the sale of qualifying property used in the taxpayer's trade or
business. See I.R.C. §§ 1202, 1231. While a corporation owning rental property would
not be entitled to a similar deduction from gross income upon the disposition of such
assets, the broad language employed by the court in Doyle would arguably support
the contention that the more favorable tax rates available under federal law should
apply to local taxation of gains from the sale of business assets. See I.R.C. § 1201.
97 The distinction for tax purposes between investment activity and conduct con-
stituting a trade or business has been well-recognized by the courts. See, e.g., Whip-
ple v. Comm'r, 373 U.S. 193 (1963). In the case of rental property, two approaches
have developed as to the extent of activity necessary to achieve trade or business
status under the federal income tax laws. See Lee, "Active Conduct" Distinguished
from "Conduct" of a Rental Real Estate Business, 25 TAX LAW. 317, 318-24 (1972).
The view followed consistently by the Tax Court is that the rental of a single unit is
sufficient to constitute a trade or business. E.g., Lagreide v. Comm'r, 23 T.C. 508,
511-13 (1954); Hazard v. Comm'r, 7 T.C. 372, 375-76 (1946). Most other courts, how-
ever, require that for a trade or business to exist there must be a "continuous, regular
and substantial activity in relation to the management of the property." Union Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 382, 384 (N.D.N.Y. 1961). Accord, Grier v.
United States, 120 F. Supp. 395 (D. Conn. 1954), aff'd per curiam, 218 F.2d 603 (2d
Cir. 1955). See generally 3B J. MERTENS, supra note 90, at § 22.144.
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and management of the venture should qualify as non-taxable
investment income to the same extent as that earned by indi-
viduals. At the very least, non-individuals should be permit-
ted to rebut this now conclusive presumption of business ac-
tivity approved by the court of appeals.
To avoid the inequities resulting from Estate of Doyle,
the treatment of rental income for occupational tax purposes
should reflect the nature and extent of the taxpayer's involve-
ment in the subject activity, rather than the form of the entity
being taxed. To this end, perhaps a more reasonable basis for
determining whether rental activity constitutes a taxable
trade or business within the meaning of the occupational tax
ordinance would be to require that such activity represent the
active conduct of a business, as opposed to the mere conduct
of a business. This distinction is raised throughout the Inter-
nal Revenue Code9" and, as the cases interpreting and apply-
ing the active trade or business requirement suggest, such cri-
teria would arguably shift the focus of inquiry away from the
nature of the taxpaying entity, and emphasize the quality of
taxpayer involvement in the rental activity in question.
D.. Allocation of Corporate Income
Finally, in Clinton Shirt Corporation v. Kentucky Board
of Tax Appeals," the Kentucky Court of Appeals was con-
" E.g., I.R.C. §§ 355(b), 761(a)(1). See generally 3 J. MERTENS, supra note 90, at
§ 20.103; Lee, supra note 97. The Tax Court has recognized that co-owners may be
treated as partners for federal income tax purposes if they actively carry on a trade or
business, as distinguished from the mere holding of property for investment purposes.
Rothenberg v. Comm'r, 48 T.C. 369, 372-73 (1967). In determining that co-owners of
rental property were in fact operating as partners under I.R.C. § 761, the Tax Court
cited previous decisions emphasizing the substantial and continuous nature of the
taxpayer's involvement in the rental activity. 48 T.C. at 373. A corporation will be
denied Subchapter S status if it derives more than 20% of its gross income from
passive investment income. I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5). This requirement was added to limit
Subchapter S treatment to businesses "actively engaged in trades or businesses." S.
REP. No. 1007, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2141, 2148. To avoid application of this passive investment income restriction
to rental income the corporation must provide "significant services" to the occupants
beyond those customarily rendered in connection with rental property. Treas. Reg. §
1.1372-4(b)(5)(vi) (1980). See City Markets, Inc. v. Comm'r, 433 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir.
1970).
9 583 S.W.2d 84 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
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fronted with an apparent incongruity among several statutory
provisions relating to the requirement that corporate taxpay-
ers allocate for Kentucky income tax purposes business in-
come earned within and without this state. Prior to amend-
ment in 1976,100 KRS section 141.010(14)(b) and KRS section
141.120(2) required corporations "having income from busi-
ness activity which is taxable both within and without this
state" to allocate and apportion net income as provided in
KRS section 141.120.101 For corporations doing business solely
in Kentucky, KRS section 141.010(14)(a) provided the appli-
cable definition of taxable net income. In Clinton Shirt, the
taxpayer sought review of adverse rulings by the Department
of Revenue and the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals, subse-
quently affirmed by the Franklin Circuit Court, denying allo-
cation of income under KRS section 141.120 on the grounds
that taxpayer was doing business solely in Kentucky.102
The facts as developed by the Board of Tax Appeals
showed that the Clinton Shirt Corporation (Clinton) was in-
corporated in New York and was a wholly owned subsidiary of
Garan, Inc. (Garan), which was located in New York City.
Clinton was a clothing manufacturer with a production facil-
ity located in Clinton, Kentucky. Officers and management of-
ficials of Garan served in similar capacities with Clinton. Sales
of Clinton products were made by sales personnel operating
out of Garan's New York City offices and who were paid with
checks drawn by Garan. The lease for the office space in New
York City was held and paid entirely by Garan. Garan
charged Clinton and other subsidiaries with an allocated por-
tion of expenses on Garan's account ledgers. 10 3 On the basis of
these facts, the Board of Tax Appeals determined that the
New York office was maintained and controlled exclusively by
100 1976 Ky. Acts, ch. 155, §§ 7, 10.
101 KRS §§ 141.010(14)(b) (1971) and 141.120(2) (1971) were amended in 1976 to
require corporations having property or payroll both within and without the state to
apportion net income as provided in KRS § 141.120. 1976 Ky. Acts ch. 155, § 7 (em-
phasis added).
102 The Board of Tax Appeals ruling is reported in 2 Ky. TAX REP. (CCH) 1 201-
345, at 10,818 (Ky. B.T.A. 1975).
10s Id. at 10,819.
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Garan 10 4 and consequently since Clinton did not own or lease
any property outside of Kentucky or have a payroll outside of
Kentucky, the Board concluded that Clinton was doing busi-
ness solely in Kentucky and denied allocation. 10 5 The Board
then applied KRS section 141.010(14)(a) as the appropriate
measure of taxable net income. 10 6
In concluding that Clinton was doing business solely
within Kentucky, the Board of Tax Appeals applied the rule
adopted by the Court in Luckett v. Heaven Hill Distilleries,
Inc.10 7 Holding that income derived from sales negotiated
through offices maintained by the taxpayer outside of Ken-
tucky was not allocable to Kentucky for income tax purposes,
the Court in Heaven Hill Distilleries stated: "To avoid alloca-
tion of out-of-state sales to Kentucky, the taxpayer must not
only negotiate the sales outside of Kentucky but must in addi-
tion thereto negotiate them from offices, agencies and places
of business maintained by the taxpayer outside of the
state." 108 The court of appeals in Clinton Shirt held that the
trial court and the Board of Tax Appeals had correctly ap-
plied the standard enunciated in Heaven Hill Distilleries,
since the New York office was under the exclusive manage-
ment and control of the parent corporation, Garan.' °9
The taxpayer further contended that allocation was re-
quired under KRS section 141.120(2) because Clinton paid an
annual franchise tax to the state of New York. KRS section
141.120(3), at the time of the dispute, provided in part that "a
104 Id.
101 Id. at 10,819-20.
100 Id.
107 336 S.W.2d 584 (Ky. 1960).
10, Id. at 585 (emphasis in original). See Luckett v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 310
S.W.2d 795 (Ky. 1958). Allocation was denied in Heaven Hill Distilleries on the
grounds that an Illinois corporation negotiating sales contracts on behalf of a Ken-
tucky corporation pursuant to an exclusive sales agreement was wholly independent
of the Kentucky corporation, and maintained offices in Illinois over which the Ken-
tucky corporation had no control. Where orders are solicited by sales personnel lo-
cated in offices outside of Kentucky, but are delivered to offices in this state for ap-
proval and processing, it has been held that receipts from such sales will not be
allocated to Kentucky for income tax purposes if the sales activity outside the state
actually induced or brought about the sale. Allphin v. Glenmore Distilleries Co., 270
S.W.2d 168, 169 (Ky. 1954).
109 583 S.W.2d at 86.
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corporation is taxable in another state if, in that state it is
subject to. . . a franchise tax for the privilege of doing busi-
ness. . . ,110 Recognizing a possible incongruity between
KRS section 141.010(14)(a) and 141.120(2), (3), the court at-
tempted to reconcile these provisions by noting that KRS sec-
tion 141.120(3) merely made payment of a franchise tax in an-
other state evidence of taxable out-of-state business activity,
and for this section to have effect there still must have been
income derived from such out-of-state business activity."'
Thus,
[E]ven if Clinton were permitted to allocate under KRS §
141.120, since there is no business income derived by it in
the state of New York, Kentucky would still receive 100% of
Clinton's state corporation income tax obligation. The result
to Clinton is the same as if only KRS § 141.010(14)(a) is
applied.
12
The Court of Appeals' decision in Heaven Hill Distiller-
ies established what seems to be a reasonable and manageable
criteria for determining when a corporation will be deemed to
have derived income from out-of-state business activity,
thereby avoiding allocation of such income to Kentucky for
income tax purposes. To the extent that the statutory provi-
sions involved in Clinton Shirt conflict, the Court of Appeals
was correct in adhering to the approach of Heaven Hill Distil-
leries and denying allocation in this instance. Perhaps in rec-
ognition of the apparent conflict created by application of the
statutory provisions involved in this case, KRS section
141.120(3) was deleted in 1976.113
110 KRS § 141.120(3) (1971) was repealed in 1976. 1976 Ky. Acts, ch. 155, § 10.
1 583 S.W.2d at 86-87.
112 Id. at 87.
113 1976 Ky. Acts, ch. 155, § 10.
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